




The issue of base erosion and profi t shifting 
(BEPS) caused by multinational companies 
is a potential important impediment to tax 
collections. Because tax planning schemes 
utilized gaps and mismatches in tax rules 
to artifi cially shift profi ts to low or no-tax 
jurisdiction where there is insuffi cient of no 
economic activity (Hines, 2014; OECD, 2017). 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) has estimated the 
general annual revenue loss of USD 100 to 240 
billion due to the BEPS OECD (2017).
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) focused 
on tax motivated income shifting between 
parent companies and their affi liates. The 
parent companies have almost 60% affi liates 
established in low-tax jurisdictions. It resulted 
in profi t shifting from the high-tax parent 
companies’ jurisdictions to the low-tax affi liates’ 
jurisdictions where the profi t is taxed with the 
lower tax rate. Companies may also benefi t 
from the difference between the statutory and 
the marginal tax rates that jurisdictions offer. 
This fact has important role in profi t shifting 
across jurisdictional boundaries (Zodrow, 
2010; Lennard, 2016; Baumann, Buchwald, 
Friehe, Hottenrott, & Weche, 2017). There 
are many authors who deal with the issue 
that multinational companies shift their 
profi ts thanks to tax differentials through the 
use of transfer pricing mechanism, royalties, 
inter-company transactions, etc. (Altshuler 
& Grubert, 2006; 2002; Hines, 1999; Desai, 
Foley, & Hines, 2004; 2006).This is not the 
only purpose of preferential tax jurisdiction. 
Companies also invest in tax havens because 
of the secrecy these jurisdictions offer (Braun 
& Weichenrieder, 2015). The number of Czech 
companies, whose owners are established in 
tax havens, have decreased approximately 
by 43% after conclusion of instruments 
for exchange of tax information with these 
jurisdictions. This indicates the importance of 
anonymity. On the other hand, companies that 
remain in the jurisdictions after conclusion of 
such instruments increase investments due 
to better tax conditions (Rohan & Moravec, 
2017).
Currently, there are four studies made by 
international organizations that are focused on 
the estimation of the international corporate 
tax avoidance caused by base erosion and 
profi t shifting: International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (2014), OECD (2015), United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (2015), European Parliament 
Research Service (EPRS) (2015). There are 
also other authors who deal with the corporate 
income tax gap (e.g. Cobham & Jansky, 
2017; Davies et al., 2015; Gumpert, Hines, 
& Schnitzer, 2016; Riedel, Zinn, & Hofmann, 
2015; Crivelli, de Mooij & Keen, 2016). Jansky 
(2016) and Jansky and Kokes (2016) defi ne 
the tax gap as the difference between the real 
amount of tax legally due and the amount that 
taxpayers actually pay.
This paper focuses on the calculation 
of corporate income tax effi ciency indicator 
and its comparison with other EU member 
states. Furthermore, the paper is aimed at 
the estimative amount of corporate income 
tax revenue that the Czech Republic might 
have lost as a result of international corporate 
tax avoidance in 2013, 2014 and 2015 and 
subsequently this paper shows variety and 
differences among different studies as the 
presented estimation is made with offi cial data 
obtained from General Financial Directorate 
instead from Eurostat and there the main 
reason for different results can be seen. The 
estimation combines the European Parliament 
Research Service’s (2015) methodology and 
the IMF (2014) approach.
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1. Materials and Methods
The corporate tax gap revenue estimation uses 
IMF (2014) and EPRS (2015) methodology. 
The methodology has been chosen for 
comparison’s purposes. EPRS (2015) research 
uses Eurostat data compared to this paper, 
which uses offi cial data from General Financial 
Directorate. Moreover the used methodology 
seems to be more precise in comparison with 
the methodology used for example by Glopolis 
(2016). This methodology estimates the tax 
gap’s impact through indicators mentioned 
below. The other methodology calculates the 
impact from total amount of EU corporate tax 
gap through ration of particular member states’ 
contributions to EU Gross Domestic Product. 
The methodology calculates the corporate 
income tax effi ciency weighted average for all 
28 European Union (EU) member states (MS) 
and net operating surplus adjusted for imputed 
compensation of self-employed as a theoretical 
corporate income tax base. These indicators 
are necessary for subsequent calculation of the 
revenue without profi t shifting. Ebrill and others 
(2001) use a similar concept of tax effi ciency 
to assess the performance of Value added 
tax. The analyzed data was obtained from 
the General Financial Directorate, AMECO, 
Eurostat and European Commission. The 
corporate tax revenue loss/gain is calculated 
for three periods: 2013, 2014 and 2015. EPRS 
(2015) study ends with the year 2013. One 
of the aims of this paper is to compare the 
results with EPRS (2015) study for 2013 and to 
continue with tax gap’s estimation for upcoming 
years. Therefore, the year 2013 was set as 
a default time-period. The observation period 
ends in 2015 because there was no updated 
data during the research preparation. The 
fi rst research question is – how the corporate 
income tax revenues of the Czech Republic 
are infl uenced by base erosion and profi t 
shifting. The second research question is – 
how effective the corporate income tax system 
of the Czech Republic is and the third one – 
how the difference in datasource infl uences the 
corporate tax gap estimation.
Based on the research questions null 
hypotheses have been established as follow:
 H01: Base erosion and profi t shifting do not 
cause a corporate income tax loss in the 
Czech Republic.
 H02: The corporate income tax effi ciency 
indicator of the Czech Republic is lower 
than EU average in the mentioned time 
period.
 H03: Difference in data source does not 
infl uence fi nal results of the corporate 
income tax gap estimation.
1.1 Corporate Income Tax Effi ciency
To begin with, an indicator of corporate income 
tax effi ciency has been constructed. The 
indicator comes from IMF’s report on spillovers:
 
(1)
The corporate income tax effi ciency for 
country i is denoted by Effi. This indicator is 
calculated for particular EU member states. 
This step is required for second equation. 
Revi represents actual corporate income tax 
revenue of country i in a local currency. The 
data of corporate income tax revenue for the 
Czech Republic comes from General Financial 
Directorate. For the rest of EU MSs, it comes 
from public fi nance and national accounts data 
from Eurostat. Ratei represents the statutory 
corporate income tax rate that is applied in 
the state i. The percentage tax rate is divided 
by 100. The data source of corporate income 
tax rate is used from European Commission’s 
publications on taxation trends in the EU. Basei 
denotes the theoretical tax base of country i. 
There are available three types of operating 
surplus, which could be used as the theoretical 
tax base. Gross operating surplus, net operating 
surplus not adjusted for imputed compensation 
for self-employed workers, who are being 
treated for tax purposes as being external 
contractors and there are are not subject of 
income taxes from employment, pension etc. 
and the last one net operating surplus adjusted 
for imputed compensation for self-employed 
workers. The paper deals with the taxes on 
the corporate income excluding income of 
self-employed persons, whose surplus above 
their costs is taxed as personal income than 
corporate profi t. Therefore the theoretical tax 
base is expressed by the net operating surplus 
adjusted for imputed compensation for self-
employed workers. AMECO is used as the data 
source of the theoretical tax base. According 
to the EPRS’s study, if the Effi takes the value 
further below one, the corporate income tax 
system is the less effi cient in acquiring revenue. 
This may indicate tax competition (e.g. tax 
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incentives) but also the profi t shifting. The 
difference between the corporate tax revenue 
data sources can be seen below. EPRS uses 
Eurostat database for its calculation. In this 
research the offi cial data from Czech General 
Financial Directorate has been used.
Hereinafter the calculation of the corporate 
income tax effi ciency for particular EU member 
states for time period 2013 is described. 
The effi ciency is needed for the subsequent 
indicator of revenue without profi t shifting 
estimation. Moreover the results confi rm 
possible differences of research outputs due to 
the different data sets.
Tab. 2 contains the calculation of the 
corporate income tax effi ciency for particular 
EU member states for time period 2014.
Tab. 3 below deals with the calculation of 
the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular 
EU member states for time period 2015.
1.2 Indicator of Revenue without Profi t 
Shifting
The second indicator gives an overview of 
how much the Czech Republic loses/gains 
from profi t shifting. The indicator represents 
a hypothetical value of tax revenues that the 
jurisdiction could have received in case there is 
not any profi t shifting applied:
 (2)
The tax revenue without profi t shifting is 
denoted by RWSi. Ratei represents the statutory 
corporate income tax rate that is applied in the 
state i. The percentage tax rate is divided by 100. 
The data source of corporate income tax rate is 
used from European Commission’s publications 
on taxation trends in the EU. Basei denotes the 
theoretical tax base of country i. The theoretical 
tax base is expressed by the net operating 
surplus adjusted for imputed compensation for 
self-employed workers. AMECO is used as the 
data source of the theoretical tax base. Effi is 
the weighted average of corporate income tax 
effi ciency rate for the entire EU. This variable 
enables to exclude base effects except profi t 
shifting. 
The fi nal effect is given by the difference 
between revenue without profi t shifting 
(RWSi) and the actual corporate income tax 
revenue denoted by Revi. The difference can 
be interpreted as the loss or gain from profi t 
shifting. In the case the actual corporate 
income tax revenue takes a higher value than 
the revenue without profi t shifting indicator then 
the jurisdiction profi ts from the profi t shifting. 
The opposite situation results in tax revenue 
losses caused by profi t shifting.
Fig. 1: The source difference of the corporate tax revenue of the Czech Republic denoted in mil. CZK
Source: own processing in accordance with Eurostat, General Financial Directorate
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Country Unit Base (bn) Tax rate (%)
Revenues 
(bn) Eff calculation Eff
Belgium EURO 34.23612 33.99 12.2091          12.2091         0.3399 × 34.23612 1.049175
Bulgaria BGN 16.57857 10 1.6231       1.6231      0.1 × 1.6231 0.979035
Czech Republic CZK 807.735 19 113.052       113.052       0.19 × 807.735 0.736641
Denmark DKK 239.6818 25 54.066         54.066        0.25 × 239.6818 0.902296
Germany EURO 445.6341 29.55 50.5             50.5            0.2955 × 445.6341 0.383491
Estonia EURO 4.315953 21 0.0618         0.0168       0.21 × 4.315953 0.068186
Ireland EURO 49.1836 12.5 4.272        4.272       0.125 × 4.272 0.694866
Greece EURO 34.82386 26 2.071          2.071         0.26 × 34.82386 0.228734
France EURO 196.7501 33.33 58.736           58.736          0.3333 × 196.7501 0.895683
Croatia HRK 32.8425 20 6.7418        6.7418        0.20 × 32.8425 1.026383
Italy EURO 174.3434 31.4 40.3767         40.3767        0.314 × 174.3434 0.737557
Cyprus EURO 4.049885 12.5 1.1714          1.1714         0.125 × 4.049885 2.313942
Latvia EURO 4.20113 15 0.3697       0.3697       0.15 × 4.20113 0.586668
Lithuania EURO 11.32114 15 0.4767         0.4767       0.15 × 11.32114 0.280714
Luxembourg EURO 10.65323 29.22 2.2128            2.2128         0.2922 × 10.65323 0.710854
Hungary HUF 6,003.473 19 416.189         416.189      0.19 × 6,003.473 0.364867
Malta EURO 1.809474 35 0.4212         0.4212       0.35 × 1.809474 0.665071
Netherlands EURO 89.4848 25 14.255        14.255      0.25 × 89.4848 0.637203
Austria EURO 45.57368 25 7.2404         7.2404       0.25 × 45.57368 0.635490
Poland PLN 488.7057 19 29.351         29.351       0.19 × 488.7057 0.316098
Portugal EURO 28.37738 25 5.5446         5.5446       0.25 × 28.37738 0.781552
Romania RON 152.5669 16 12.826         12.826       0.16 × 152.5669 0.525425
Tab. 1: Calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2013 (Part 1)
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Country Unit Base (bn) Tax rate (%)
Revenues 
(bn) Eff calculation Eff
Slovenia EURO 0.816451 17 0.4332         0.4332       0.17 × 0.816451 3.121112
Slovakia EURO 19.6832 23 2.1178         2.1178       0.23 × 19.6832 0.467801
Finland EURO 23.51961 24.5 4.799           4.799         0.245 × 23.51961 0.832827
Sweden SEK 461.493 22 100.811       100.811     0.22 × 461.493 0.992933
United Kingdom GBP 297.2532 23 41.644         41.644       0.23 × 297.2532 0.609113
Source: authors’ own calculation, AMECO, General Financial Directorate, European Commission, Eurostat
Country Unit Base (bn) Tax rate (%)
Revenues 
(bn) Eff calculation Eff
Belgium EURO 38.17151 33.99 12.8901           12.8901        0.3399 × 38.17151 0.993495
Bulgaria BGN 14.64406 10 1.6582         1.6582       0.10 × 14.64406 1.132336
Czech Republic CZK 948.5900 19 123.179      123.179     0.19 × 948.59 0.683447
Denmark DKK 243.5001 24.5 55.784         55.784       0.245 × 243.5001 0.935071
Germany EURO 461.7875 29.58 51          51.0        0.2958 × 29.58 0.373362
Estonia EURO 4.29285 21 0.0689         0.0689       0.21 × 4.29285 0.076428
Ireland EURO 54.48542 12.5 4.6169           4.6169        0.125 × 54.48542 0.677891
Greece EURO 32.47029 26 3.349          3.349        0.26 × 32.47029 0.396694
France EURO 201.6106 33.33 57.063           57.063          0.3333 × 201.6106 0.849192
Croatia HRK 38.07952 20 5.8247         5.8247       0.20 × 38.07952 0.764807
Italy EURO 183.1952 31.4 35.0612         35.0612       0.314 × 183.1952 0.609513
Cyprus EURO 3.842498 12.5 1.1121           1.1121        0.125 × 3.842498 2.315369
Latvia EURO 3.856079 15 0.3637         0.3637       0.15 × 3.856079 0.628791
Lithuania EURO 11.40447 15 0.4998         0.4998       0.15 × 11.40447 0.292166
Tab. 1: Calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2013 (Part 2)
Tab. 2: Calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2014 (Part 1)
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Country Unit Base (bn) Tax rate (%)
Revenues 
(bn) Eff calculation Eff
Luxembourg EURO 12.05523 29.22 2.1398            2.1398         0.2922 × 12.05523 0.607460 
Hungary HUF 6,845.882 19 534.652         534.652       0.19 × 6,845.882 0.411040 
Malta EURO 1.871742 35 0.4475         0.4475       0.35 × 1.871742 0.683092
Netherlands EURO 89.1968 25 17.09          17.09       0.25 × 89.1968 0.766395
Austria EURO 45.71002 25 7.273         7.273       0.25 × 45.71002 0.636447
Poland PLN 505.1986 19 30.04          30.04        0.19 × .194986n 0.312957
Portugal EURO 29.76808 23 4.8967         4.8967       0.23 × 29.76808 0.715196
Romania RON 152.4887 16 14.1964         14.1964      0.16 × 152.4887 0.581863
Slovenia EURO 1.51095 17 0.5287         0.5287      0.17 × 1.51095 2.058308
Slovakia EURO 19.31105 22 2.5044          2.5044      0.22 × .224405n 0.589488
Finland EURO 24.4328 20 3.956          3.956       0.20 × 24.4328 0.809567
Sweden SEK 509.9859 22 103.237        103.237      0.22 × 509.9859 0.920141
United Kingdom GBP 331.8269 21 41.264         41.264       0.21 × 331.8269 0.592162
Source: Authors’ own calculation, AMECO, General Financial Directorate, European Commission, Eurostat
Tab. 2: Calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2014 (Part 2)
Country Unit Base (bn) Tax rate (%)
Revenues 
(bn) Eff calculation Eff
Belgium EURO 43.48916 33.99 13.8169           13.8169        0.3399 × 43.48916 0.934713
Bulgaria BGN 15.22104 10 1.8034         1.8034       0.10 × 15.22104 1.184807
Czech Republic CZK 1,013.1040 19 138.14         138.14       0.19 × 1013.104 0.717649
Denmark DKK 229.6731 22 53.08          53.08        0.22 × 229.6731 1.050500
Germany EURO 487.3359 29.72 52.9              52.9           0.2972 × 487.3359 0.365240
Tab. 3: Calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2015 (Part 1)
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Country Unit Base (bn) Tax rate (%)
Revenues 
(bn) Eff calculation Eff
Estonia EURO 3.59341 20 0.0381        0.0381      0.20 × 3.59341 0.053014
Ireland EURO 80.50267 12.5 6.8718           6.8718        0.125 × 12.50267 0.682889
Greece EURO 31.18964 29 3.8            3.8          0.29 × 31.18964 0.420122
France EURO 216.9506 33.33 57.699            57.699         0.3333 × 216.9506 0.797943
Croatia HRK 38.06926 20 6.3113         6.3113       0.20 × 38.06926 0.828923
Italy EURO 189.0033 31.4 33.4663          33.4663       0.314 × 189.0033 0.563909
Cyprus EURO 3.919699 12.5 1.0456           1.0456        0.125 × 3.919699 2.134041
Latvia EURO 3.43082 15 0.3886        0.3886      0.15 × 3.43082 0.755116
Lithuania EURO 10.67051 15 0.5739         0.5739       0.15 × 10.67051 0.358558
Luxembourg EURO 12.89701 29.22 2.2951            2.2951         0.2922 × 12.89701 0.609021
Hungary HUF 7,113.497 19 613.522        613.522       0.19 × 7,113.497 0.453930
Malta EURO 2.207586 35 0.5108         0.5108       0.35 × 2.207586 0.661097
Netherlands EURO 94.3608 25 18.43         18.43       0.25 × 94.3608 0.781257
Austria EURO 47.05711 25 7.9394         7.9394       0.25 × 47.05711 0.674874
Poland PLN 539.9078 19 33.104         33.104       0.19 × 539.9078 0.322706
Portugal EURO 32.48048 21 5.6136         5.6136       0.21 × .21.48048 0.823000
Romania RON 177.8497 16 16.7274        16.7274      0.16 × 177.8497 0.587835
Slovenia EURO 1.763751 17 0.568         0.568       0.17 × 1.763751 1.894358
Slovakia EURO 19.67942 22 2.9453         2.9453       0.22 × 19.67942 0.680291
Finland EURO 26.32965 20 4.547          4.547        0.20 × 26.32965 0.863475
Sweden SEK 566.7271 22 124.096         124.096       0.22 × 566.7271 0.995316
United Kingdom GBP 338.9224 20 43.215         43.215       0.20 × 338.9224 0.637535
Source: Authors’ own calculation, AMECO, General Financial Directorate, European Commission, Eurostat
Tab. 3: Calculation of the corporate income tax effi ciency for particular EU member states for time period 2015 (Part 2)
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2. Results
The EU member states corporate income tax 
effi ciency for the periods 2013-2015 calculated 
by the fi rst equation can be seen in Fig. 2.
The Czech Republic’s corporate income 
tax effi ciency rate is approximately 70%, 
which is a very good result in comparison with 
Germany and Poland that have between 2013-
2015, approximately 35%. This low number for 
Germany and Poland could be caused by base 
erosion and profi t shifting.
The corporate income tax effi ciency of the 
particular EU member state is used for the 
calculation of the weighted average of corporate 
income tax effi ciency rate.
In 2013 the Czech Republic’s income 
tax effi ciency rate is approximately 74%, in 
2014 it is approximately 68% and in 2015 it 
is approximately 72%. The Czech Republic 
is approaching the EU averagein mentioned 
period, but does not reach it. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis H02 is accepted.
With the EU average effi ciency, the RWS 
calculation can be made. Based on the second 
equation the following results have been 
calculated (see Tab. 4).
If there was not be a base erosion and 
profi t shifting among the EU member states, 
the Czech Republic could have the amounts 
mentioned above as a corporate tax revenue. 
This hypothetical indicator is compared to the 
actual amount of corporate tax revenue. The 
difference can be interpreted as the loss or gain 
from profi t shifting. For a better overview of the 
results, see Tab. 5.
As shown in Tab. 5 it is evident that the 
theoretical corporate tax revenue, which 
represents revenue without profi t shifting 
(RWS), takes higher value than the actual 
corporate tax revenue (Rev). It resulted in 
loss of corporate tax revenue caused by profi t 
shifting. In 2013, the Czech Republic lost CZK 
9,404 mil. due to the base erosion and profi t 
shifting. In 2014 the Czech Republic had its 
Fig. 2: EU member states corporate income tax effi ciency for periods 2013-2015
Source: own processing in accordance with AMECO, General Financial Directorate, European Commission, Eurostat
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Fig. 3: Weighted average of corporate income tax effi ciency rate in EU between 2013-2015
Source: Authors’ own calculation, AMECO, General Financial Directorate, European Commission, Eurostat
Year Tax rate (%) Base(mil. CZK) Effi RWS calculation
RWS
(mil. CZK)
2013 19 807,735 0.797915 0.19 × 807.735 × 0.797915 122,456
2014 19 948,590 0.756025 0.19 × 948.590 × 0.756025 136,260
2015 19 1,013,104 0.771560 0.19 × 1,013.104 × 0.771560 148,517
Source: Authors’ own calculation, AMECO, European Commission
Year RWS Rev RWS–Rev
2013 122,456 113,052 9,404
2014 136,260 123,179 13,081
2015 148,517 138,140 10,377
Source: Authors’ own calculation, General Financial Directorate
Tab. 4: Calculation of the indicator of revenue without profi t shifting for the Czech Republic for the time periods 2013, 2014, 2015
Tab. 5: Calculation of the profi t shifting effect (denoted in mil. CZK)
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highest tax revenue loss, reaching up CZK 
13,081 mil.
The main difference in comparison with 
the EPRS (2015) research, can be seen from 
Fig. 1. There is approximately 20 billion CZK 
difference between Eurostat data and offi cial 
General Financial Directorate data. In the case 
of the Czech Republic, ERPS (2015) study 
resulted in 0.484 billion EURO (approximately 
12.5 billion CZK) tax gain in 2013 from based 
erosion and profi t shifting within EU. On the 
other hand, this paper re-estimated the tax 
loss with the same methodology except used 
data. The paper resulted in approximately 
9.404 billion CZK tax loss. The null hypotheses 
H01 and H03 are rejected. And alternative 
hypotheses are accepted. In Tab. 5 and Fig. 4 it 
was confi rmed that the base erosion and profi t 
shifting cause corporate tax revenue loss in the 
Czech Republic in the observed period. Also it 
was confi rmed that different data sources may 
infl uence fi nal results signifi cantly.
3. Discussion
At the very beginning, it is very important to focus 
on the corporate income tax effi ciency rate which 
is depicted by Figs. 2 and 3. Between 2013 and 
2015 the Czech Republic is approaching the EU 
average. Germany and Poland have one of the 
lowest effi ciency rate, which may be caused by 
base erosion and profi t shifting. Corporate tax 
gap estimation studies concerning the Czech 
Republic have a very broad range related to 
the estimated amount. The estimated amount 
is located between CZK 57 billion loss and CZK 
12.5 billion gain. Author shave observed that 
the corporate tax revenue loss is approximately 
CZK 9.404 billion in 2013. These fi ndings are 
close to UNCTAD (2015) extrapolation for the 
Czech Republic whose estimation is also CZK 
12 billion. IMF (2014) extrapolation estimates 
the corporate tax gap of 8 billion CZK. Jansky 
and Cobham (2017) estimate on the IMF 
(2015) basis, approximately CZK 7 billion. It is 
the similar methodology that has been used 
in this paper. The result depends on the input 
database. For instance, the difference that is 
shown in the Fig. 1. EPRS (2015) uses for its 
estimation Eurostat as a database of actual 
corporate tax revenue. EPRS (2015) study 
resulted in CZK 12.5 billion gain of corporate 
tax revenue for the Czech Republic in 2013 due 
to the profi t shifting. On the other hand, authors 
have changed the Eurostat database to the 
Fig. 4: Corporate tax revenue loss of the Czech Republic between 2013-2015 (denoted in mil. CZK)
Source: Authors’ own calculation
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offi cial data of General Financial Directorate on 
this study. Subsequently, CZK 9.404 billion loss 
of corporate tax revenue in 2013 for the Czech 
Republic has been calculated.
Glopolis (2016) brings another point of view. 
According to its estimation, the Czech Republic 
can lose up to CZK 57 billion corporate tax 
revenue caused by base erosion and profi t 
shifting. This fi gure is obtained from the EPRS 
(2015) estimation for entire sample i.e. EU 28. 
The tax loss for entire EU is estimated in 
amount of EUR 160-190 billion. The amount of 
CZK 57 billion is calculated from the ration of 
the Czech Republic’s contributions to EU Gross 
Domestic Product. The authors consider that 
this is a relatively high number and very rough 
estimation. From the authors’ point of view, the 
amount of corporate tax revenue that Czech 
Republic loses is generally between 0 and 
20 billion CZK.
There can be another approach. Rohan and 
Moravec (2017) dealt with the tax information 
exchange impact on the number of companies 
relocated and on the amount of foreign direct 
investments shifted. The profi t shifting or the tax 
avoidance is being widely infl uenced by agreed 
instruments on exchange of information. There 
can be two kinds of taxpayers’ reactions.
The fi rst reaction confi rms that some 
companies are interested in anonymity. Rohan 
and Moravec’s (2017) study indicates taxpayers’ 
companies relocation from jurisdictions that are 
covered by measures of information exchange 
to the jurisdictions that are not covered by the 
mechanism of information exchange. These 
shifted taxpayers may prefer anonymity to tax 
benefi ts as they do carry out direct investments 
into the non-contractual jurisdictions to keep 
the anonymity and they decided to bear the 
vindicatory 35% withholding tax, applied in the 
Czech Republic for example (see Section 36 
subsection 1 letter c) of the Act No. 586/1992 
Coll., as amended).
The second detected reaction of taxpayers 
shows, on the other side, an increase of foreign 
direct investments at the same moment, the 
agreements on exchange of information are 
concluded (or similar measures) with the 
preferential tax jurisdiction. As when such 
instruments are concluded the taxation of 
transactions is targeted by a specifi c provision 
and the tax is withheld at the level of 15% only. 
The Rohan and Moravec’s study (2017) results 
show that Czech multinational companies, 
remaining in preferential tax jurisdictions since 
the anonymity was cancelled, increased the 
amount of their foreign direct investments, 
i.e. the remaining companies’ owners prefer 
favorable tax regime instead of anonymity and 
use the new tax benefi t while increasing the 
amount of direct investments.
The amount of estimated losses due to the tax 
haven might be considered politically motivated 
as well (Široký, 2005). The understanding of the 
offshore issue importance is highly individual 
from different points of view of different states 
(Kristofi k, Istok, & Nedelova, 2017). For Germany 
and Poland the base erosion and profi t shifting is 
a huge problem (e.g. Meyering & Groene, 2017; 
Maurer, Port, Roth, & Walker, 2017; Stolicna & 
Cernicka, 2017). However, the Czech Republic 
is one of the countries being relatively successful 
in corporate tax collection compared to most 
countries based on the current study results. 
Nevertheless, the Czech Republic must follow 
the OECD and EU and meet the requirements 
relating to the offshore industry elimination and 
apply the instruments increasing the intensity 
of tax information exchange to prevent the 
base erosion and profi t shifting among states, 
even though the Czech Republic is particularly 
as a state facing the relatively high VAT gap 
(CASE, 2015) the issue which infl uenced the 
state budget income and seems to be an issue 
of higher importance from the point of view of the 
Czech Republic tax administration. The countries 
with higher political power are more or less the 
states facing the higher amount of losses due to 
the base erosion and profi t shifting comparing to 
the countries keeping lower political power as 
the Czech Republic, which faces the problem 
of VAT gap particularly, as the studies showed. 
Such situation results in implementation of 
huge amount of instruments fi ghting the tax 
competition with relatively questionable benefi ts 
for some states as the Czech Republic.
Conclusion
This paper identifi es the signifi cant effect of 
base erosion and profi t shifting. The research 
estimates the corporate tax revenue loss in 
2013, 2014 and 2015. In 2013, the corporate 
tax revenue loss was CZK 9,404 mil. In 2014, 
the corporate tax revenue loss was CZK 13,081 
mil., which was the highest amount in the 
examined period. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
H01 was rejected. Studies dealing with a similar 
issue have different results. For instace, EPRS 
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(2015) study resulted in CZK 12.5 billion gain of 
corporate tax revenue for the Czech Republic 
in 2013 due to the profi t shifting. There is 
approximately CZK 22 billion difference.
According to Glopolis (2016) study, the Czech 
Republic can lose up to CZK 57 billion corporate 
tax revenue caused by profi t shifting. Glopolis 
used different methodology, which uses ration 
of the Czech Republic’s contributions to EU 
Gross Domestic Product, compared to this 
paper. The results’ difference could have been 
caused by the used methodology or different 
data source.
The authors are convinced that if offi cial 
data of a particular EU member state instead 
of the Eurostat database (see the difference 
in Fig. 1) was used, there would be totally 
different results. Thus the null hypothesis H03 
was rejected.
From Figs. 2 and 3 there could be seen 
that the Czech Republic is approaching EU 
corporate income tax effi ciency average but 
the EU average is still slightly higher than the 
Czech Republic’s income tax effi ciency rate. 
Therefore the null hypothesis H02 was accepted.
In comparison with neighboring countries, such 
as Poland and Germany, which have the lowest 
corporate income tax effi ciency average within 
EU, the Czech Republic still has suffi cient 
results.
From this research results it is noticeable 
that corporate tax revenue loss is not such a big 
issue as the VAT tax gap problem.
This article has been supported by the 
Internal Granting Agency (IGA) of the FEM 
CULS Prague, the project No. 20171032 
– International Corporate Tax Gap Size 
Estimation and Profi t Shifting Relevant Factors 
Identifi cation.
References
Act No. 586/1992 Coll., on Income Taxes, 
as amended. Retrieved May 7, 2018, from 
https://www.fulsoft.cz.
Altshuler, R., & Grubert, H. (2002). 
Repatriation Taxes, Repatriation Strategies, 
and Multinational Financial Policy. Journal of 
Public Economics, 87(1), 73-107. https://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00173-6.
Altshuler, R., & Grubert, H. (2006).
Governments and Multinational Corporations 
in the Race to the Bottom. Tax Notes, 110(8), 
459-474.
Baumann, F., Buchwald, A., Friehe, 
T., Hottenrott, H., & Weche, J. (2017). Tax 
enforcement and corporate profi t shifting. Applied 
Economics Letters, 24(13), 902-905. https://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2016.1240331.
Braun, J., & Weichenrieder, A. (2015). Does 
Exchange of Information Between Tax Authorities 
Infl uence Multinationals’ Use of Tax Havens? 
[ZEW Discussion Papers 15-015, 39]. ZEW – 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung 
/ Center for European Economic Research. 
Retrieved May 7, 2018, from http://www.
econstor.eu/handle/10419/107595.
CASE. (2015). Study to quantify and 
analyse the VAT Gap in the EU Member States 
2015 Report [TAXUD/2013/DE/321]. Retrieved 
January 7, 2018, from https://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/
body/vat_gap2013.pdf.
Cobham, A., & Jansky, P. (2017). Global 
distribution of revenue loss from tax avoidance: 
Re-estimation and country results [WIDER 
Working Paper, 55/2017]. Retrieved May 20, 
2018, from http://hdl.handle.net/10419/163026.
Crivelli, E., de Mooij, R., & Keen, M. (2016). 
Base Erosion, Profi t Shifting and Developing 
Countries. Finanzarchiv: Public Finance 
Analysis, 72(3), 268-301. https://dx.doi.org/10.
1628/001522116X14646834385460.
Davies, R. B., Martin, J., Parenti, M., & 
Toubal, F. (2015). Knocking on Tax Haven’s 
Door: Multinational Firms and Transfer Pricing 
[SSRN Scholarly Paper, No. ID 2666947]. 
Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network. Retrieved October 7, 2017, from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2666947.
Desai, M., Foley, C. F., & Hines, J. R. 
(2004). Foreign Direct Investment in a World 
of Multiple Taxes. Journal of Public Economics, 
88(12), 2727-2744. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jpubeco.2003.08.004.
Desai, M., Foley, C. F., & Hines, J. R., 
Jr. (2006). The Demand for Tax Haven 
Operations. Journal of Public Economics, 
90(3), 513-531. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jpubeco.2005.04.004.
Dharmapala, D., & Riedel, N. (2013). 
Earnings Shocks and Tax-Motivated 
Income-Shifting: Evidence from European 
Multinationals. Journal of Public Economics, 
97(1), 95-107. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jpubeco.2012.08.004.
EM_1_2019.indd   168 8.3.2019   9:16:25
1691, XXII, 2019
Finance
Ebrill, L., Keen, M., Bodin, J.-P., & Summers, 
V. (2001). The Modern VAT. Washington: 
International Monetary Fund.
EPRS. (2015). Bringing transparency, 
coordination and convergence to corporate 
tax policies in the European Union: 
Assessment of the magnitude of aggressive 




European Commission. (2016). Taxation 
Trends in the European Union, Data for the 
EU Member States, Iceland and Norway. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.2785/751842.
Glopolis. (2016). Výzva politikům: Zaměřte 
se na daňové ráje! Retrieved October 7, 
2017, from http://glopolis.org/cs/clanky/vyzva-
politikum-zamerte-se-na-danove-raje/.
Gumpert, A., Hines, J. R., & Schnitzer, 
M. (2016). Multinational fi rms and tax 
havens. Review of Economics and Statistics, 
98(4), 713-727. https://dx.doi.org/10.1162/
REST_a_00591.
Hines, J. R. (1999). Lessons from Behavioral 
Responses to International Taxation. National 
Tax Journal, 52(2), 305-322.
Hines, J. R. (2014). How Serious Is the 
Problem of Base Erosion and Profi t Shifting? 
Canadian Tax, 62(2) 443-453.
International Monetary Fund. (2014). 
Spillovers in International Corporate Taxation 
[IMF Policy Paper]. Retrieved May 20, 2017, 
from http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/
050914.pdf.
Jansky, P. (2016). Estimating the Costs 
of International Corporate Tax Avoidance: 
The Case of the Czech Republic [Working 
Papers IES, No. 2016/21]. Charles University 
Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute 
of Economic Studies. Retrieved May 14, 
2017, from http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/
fauwpaper/wp2016_5f21.htm.
Jansky, P., & Kokes, O. (2016). Profi t-
shifting from Czech multinational companies 
to European tax havens. Applied Economics 
Letters, 23(16), 1130-1133. https://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/13504851.2015.1137543.
Kristofi k, P., Istok, M., & Nedelova, G. (2017). 
Motives of Establishing of New Onshore and 
Offshore Companies by the Slovak Enterprises 
in 2014. Politická ekonomie, 65(2), 198-216. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.polek.1136.
Lennard, M. (2016). Base Erosion and 
Profi t Shifting and Developing Country Tax 
Administrations. Intertax, 44(10), 740-745.
Maurer, L., Port, C., Roth, T., & Walker, J. 
(2017). A Brave New Post-BEPS World: New 
Double Tax Treaty Between Germany and 
Australia Implements BEPS Measures. Intertax, 
45(4), 310-321.
Meyering, S., & Groene, M. (2017). An 
Analysys of the Assessment of Taxable Earnings 
in Germany. Journal of Tax Reform, 3(1), 18-28. 
https://dx.doi.org/10.15826/jtr.2017.3.1.028.
OECD. (2017). Backgroud Brief Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS. Retrieved January 
20, 2018, from https://www.oecd.org/ctp/
background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-
beps-implementation.pdf.
OECD. (2015). Mandatory Disclosure 
Rules, Action 12: 2015 Final Report. https://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241442-en.
Riedel, N., Zinn, T., & Hofmann, P. (2015). 
Do Transfer Pricing Laws Limit International 
Income Shifting? Evidence from Europe. 




Rohan, J., & Moravec, L. (2017). Tax 
Information Exchange Infl uence on Czech 
Based Companies’ Behavior in Relation to 
Tax Havens. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae 
et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 
65(2), 721-726. https://doi.org/10.11118/
actaun201765020721.
Rohan, J., & Moravec, L. (2017). Tax 
Information Exchange Impact on FDI: Tax 
Havens Czech Case Study. Saint Luis 
University School of Law Journal. Retrieved 
May 27, 2018, from http://law.slu.edu/lukas-
moravec-jan-rohan.
Stolicna, Z., & Cernicka, D. (2017).
Tax Systems Changes in V4 Countries 
during Financial Crisis. In Sustainable 
Economic Growth, Education Excellence and 
Innovation Management through Vision 2020 
(pp. 2546-2551). Vienna: IBIMA.
Široký, J. (2005). The possibility of using 
corporate profi ts tax as an economic policy 
instrument (on the example of effective tax rates 
in the new EU member states. In Proceedings 
of the 5th International Conference on Econoic 
Policy in the New EU (pp. 22-23). Ostrava: 
VSB.
EM_1_2019.indd   169 8.3.2019   9:16:25
170 2019, XXII, 1
Finance
UNCTAD. (2015). World Investment Report 
2015 – Reforming International Investment 
Governance. Retrieved October 27, 2017, 
from http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
wir2015_en.pdf.
Zodrow, G. R. (2010). Capital Mobility and 
Capital Tax Competition. National Tax Journal, 
63(4), 865-902. https://dx.doi.org/10.17310/
ntj.2010.4S.03.
Ing. Lukáš Moravec, Ph.D.
Czech University of Life Sciences Prague
Faculty of Economics and Management




Czech University of Life Sciences Prague
Faculty of Economics and Management
Department of Business and Finance
Czech Republic
rohan@pef.czu.cz
Ing. Jana Hinke, Ph.D.
University of West Bohemia
Faculty of Economics
Department of Finance and Accounting
Czech Republic
hinke@kfu.zcu.cz




ESTIMATION OF INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING IMPACT ON CORPORATE 
TAX GAP IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Lukáš Moravec, Jan Rohan, Jana Hinke
There are many studies focusing on VAT (value added tax) tax gap but very few relevant studies 
that deal with the corporate income tax loss. The studies vary particularly in their methodology, 
databases and interpretation. In the case of the Czech Republic the studies resulted in a range 
between CZK 57 billion tax gap and CZK 12.5 billion corporate tax revenue gain caused by the tax 
planning. The main aim of the paper is to calculate the corporate income tax effi ciency rate for the 
Czech Republic and compare it with other member states. The indicator of corporate income tax 
effi ciency is important for the calculation of the tax revenue without profi t shifting (RWS) indicator 
and then the subsequent corporate income tax gap estimation for 2013-2015, which is the second 
goal of the paper. The RWS indicator gives an overview of the Czech Republic´s amount of loses/
gains relating to the corporate tax base erosion and corporate profi t shifting. In the case when the 
actual corporate income tax revenue takes a higher value than the revenue without profi t shifting 
indicator the jurisdiction benefi ts from the profi t shifting operations. The opposite situation results 
in tax revenue losses caused by profi t shifting to other “more attractive” tax jurisdictions. Authors’ 
study re-estimation results in approximately CZK 9.404 billion tax gap caused by base erosion and 
profi t shifting instead of 12.5 billion CZK that shows EPRS’s study for period 2013. The third aim of 
the paper is to deal with the difference between input data from Eurostat database and offi cial data 
from General Financial Directorate.
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